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ADDRESSING THE TENSION BETWEEN
THE CLERGY-COMMUNICANT PRIVILEGE
AND THE DUTY TO REPORT CHILD ABUSE
IN STATE STATUTES
NORMAN ABRAMS*
Abstract: Every state provides some statutory form of an evidentiary
clergy-communicant privilege to protect certain types of conversations
between clergy members and individuals. Likewise, every state imposes a
statutory obligation on certain individuals to report suspected child
abuse. The relationship between clergy privilege statutes and child
abuse reporting requirements has received much attention recently due
to the numerous allegations of child sexual misconduct by clergy
members. This Article surveys the variations on clergy privileges and
child abuse reporting statutes in the fifty states. The Article then
discusses the varying approaches the states take in addressing the
relationship between the obligation to report and the clergy privilege. A
majority of states expressly exempt clergy-privileged information from
reporting requirements; some states expressly abrogate the clergy
privilege in the child abuse reporting context; and a third group of
states do not confront the issue at all. This Article argues that there is a
need for uniformity and proposes a partial-abrogation solution that will
help alleviate the tension between the clergy privilege and mandatory
reporting requirements.
INTRODUCTION
A once obscure evidentiary privilege—the priest-penitent privi-
lege, or as it should be more generally termed today, the clergy-
communicant privilege—has become the subject of increased interest
in recent years, mainly as a result of the numerous instances of
* 2003 Norman Abrams, Interim Dean and Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. I
am indebted to a number of people in connection with the preparation of this Article:
Professor Robert Goldstein, UCLA, who commented on an earlier version of the Article;
Professor Brenda D. Smith, SUNY, Albany, for ideas suggested in conversation that are
reflected in the Article; participants in the Boston College Law School Symposium (where
this Article was first presented), whose comments led to a different focus for the second
half of the Article; and Matthew Schwoeffer Reynolds, UCLA Law, 2004, for careful re-
search on the complex web of relevant state laws.
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charges of child molestation that have surfaced involving church per-
sonnel. Much attention has focused on the relationship between this
privilege and state statutory obligations to report child abuse.
In fact, the duty to report child abuse often arises in settings that
have nothing to do with the clergy-communicant privilege. For exam-
ple, information regarding child abuse by church personnel may be
transmitted to church officials from clergy or non-clergy persons such
as the victims, family members or friends of the victim in circum-
stances not covered by the clergy privilege. Similarly, church officials
may conduct investigations and otherwise obtain information from
sources in unprivileged contexts.
Still, the attention that has focused on the clergy privilege and its
relation to the statutory obligation to report child abuse is warranted.
There is an obvious tension between such an evidentiary privilege and
the imposition of a statutory reporting obligation. How the legal sys-
tem resolves or should resolve this tension is a subject worthy of ex-
amination. Furthermore, communications to members of the clergy
by the perpetrator of child abuse can be an invaluable source of in-
formation. Such communications will often pose clergy privilege is-
sues, and the question is whether the clergy privilege-child abuse re-
porting requirement relationship, as it presently exists in the states,
adequately addresses the tension inherent in such situations.
Beginning about thirty years ago, individual states began to
change the scope of their clergy privilege statutes) During this same
period, every state enacted a statutory duty to report child abuse. 2 Al-
though there are some differences in the scope of the clergy privilege
described in the various state statutes, there is even greater variability
among the state child abuse reporting statutes regarding whether
clergy are obligated to report, and if so, whether clergy must report
communications covered by the clergy privilege. 5
The variations in the state laws relating to this subject cover the
gamut of possibilities. Some states do not appear to impose any duty
on clergy to report. 4 A majority of states, however, do impose such a
duty.5
 Among the states that do impose a duty to report, some ex-
pressly abrogate the application of the clergy privilege in the report-
ing context, that is, they require reporting despite the otherwise-
See infra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 30-34,51-55 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
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privileged nature of the communication. 6 At the same time, a
significant number of states take the opposite tack and exempt from
the reporting requirement communications that fall within the clergy
privilege,?
Although some differences among the states in attitudes and val-
ues regarding the proper scope of a requirement to report child
abuse or differences in the value and importance of the clergy privi-
lege are to be expected, the degree of divergence is unacceptable.
There are reasons why a modicum of consistency and uniformity
among the states in this area of law is desirable. The challenge is to
identify a position that best accommodates the different concerns and
is one that all of the states might be persuaded to adopt.
Part LA summarizes the history of the clergy privilege in the
United States. 8 Part LB surveys the various ways individual states have
described the clergy privilege . 8 Part LC provides a general overview of
the various state child abuse reporting statutes.° Part I.D discusses
how varied are the approaches that the states take in addressing the
relationship between the obligation to report child abuse and the
clergy privilege." Part II presents a hypothesis regarding what might
explain the existing variation in approaches, 12 Next, Part III suggests a
way to resolve the quandary presented by the divergent approaches in
existing law by making a proposal for the reform of state statutes on
this subject." Finally, Part IV explores the issues and concerns raised
by this proposal."
6
 Sec infra note 59.
7 See infra note 58.
8 See infra notes 15-28 and accompanying text.
9 Sec infra notes 29-50 and accompanying text.
1 ° Sec infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
n See infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 68-86 and accompanying text.
18
 See infra notes 87-112 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 113-136 and accompanying text.
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1. A SURVEY OF THE STATE STATUTORY SCHEMES
A. The Historical Transition to the Modern Statutes
1. The Early Days of the Privilege: From First Recognition to the Mid-
1950s
The first acknowledgement of the clergy privilege in this country
was in People v. Phillips, where the Court of General Sessions for the
City of New York in 1813 recognized a privilege not to give testimony
for a Roman Catholic priest who relied on the seal of the confes-
sional.° New York subsequently by statute recognized the result in
Phillips: "No minister of the gospel, or priest of any denomination
whatsoever, shall be allowed to disclose any confessions made to him
in his professional character, in the course of discipline enjoined by
rules or practice of such denomination." 16
To the extent that a clergy privilege was recognized, from the
early nineteenth century through at least the 1950s, this privilege fol-
lowed the pattern of the New York statute, that is, the states recog-
nized a confessional or priest-penitent privilege. This privilege pro-
tected against judicial compulsion of testimony regarding confessions
that the applicable religious doctrine required the penitent to make
and where secrecy was enjoined on the clergy involved in hearing the
confession. This restricted form of the privilege did not apply to the
clergy of all religious denominations: it only applied to Roman Catho-
lic priests, probably to Episcopal priests, and possibly Lutheran minis-
ters." Thus, for example, in 1923 in the second edition of his treatise,
John Wigmore spoke of "a privilege for the confessions to a priest"
and stated:
[I]n more than one half of the jurisdictions of the United
States the privilege has been sanctioned by statute. In the
it
 This case was not officially reported, but the record and opinion were later re-
printed in 1 W. U. 109 (1843).
16
 Note, Privileged Communications to Clergymen, 1 CATu. LAW. 199, 213 (1955) (quoting
N.Y. REV. STAT. tit. 3, § 72 (1828)). Four years after the decision in Phillips, a New York
court in People v. Smith permitted a Protestant minister to testify to statements made to him
by the defendant confessing the crime, where the minister had been visiting him in his
capacity as a minister of the gospel. The minister when asked by the judge indicated that
he did not object to testifying regarding the defendant's statements. 2 N.Y. City-Hall Re-
corder 77 (1817).
17 JoInv C. Bum & WILLIAM HAROLD TIEMANN, THE	 TO SILENCE 25-26,60-61,
66-68 (3d ed. 1989).
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application of these statutes, ... the privilege applies only to
communications made in ... pursuance of that church dis-
cipline which gives rise to the confessional relation, and,
therefore, in particular to confessions of sin only, not to
communications of other tenor . . 18
Furthermore, when the American Law Institute's Model Code of
Evidence was drafted in the early 1940s, it included this confessional
or priest.-penitent privilege. 19 Similarly, when the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") originally
published the Uniform Rules of Evidence in 1953, they included a
similar priest-penitent privilege." Significantly, the comment to that
rule stated: "The privilege is intentionally limited to communications
by communicants within the sanctity and under the necessity of their
own disciplinary requirements. Any broader treatment would open
the door to abuse and would clearly not be in the public interest." 21
Thus, until the 1950s, the dominant version of the clergy privilege in
the United States provided an evidentiary privilege only for confes-
sional communications that were part of the religious observance of
the communicant and the clergy member.
2. The Modern Form of the Privilege: From the 1950s to the Present
While a broader and different clergy privilege may have surfaced
earlier in individual states, it was only in the 1960s and 1970s that a
legislative formulation of a broader privilege emerged nationally,
spurred by the promulgation of several influential evidence codes. 22
Is Wigmore here cited and quoted thirty U.S. jurisdictions that provided for a confes-
sional privilege. 5 joim H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2395 (2d ed. 1923); see
JOHN H. WIGMORE, A STUDENTS' TEXTBOOK OF THE LAW or EVIDENCE 411-12 (1935); 8
JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2395 (4th ed. 1961).
19 See MODEL Cons: or Evm. R. 219 (1942).
" See U N IF. R. Evm. 29.
21 Id. ant.
22 See S.C. ConE ANN. § 19-11-90 (Law. Co-op. 2002) for an example of a statute en-
acted before 1960. When the California Evidence Code was enacted in 1967, it, too, in-
cluded a clergyman-penitent privilege. However, it slightly broadened the privilege—not
specifying as a requirement that the penitential communication be a "confession." While
the significance of that change is debatable, it can be seen as not changing the confes-
sional privilege in any basic way. The privilege in California was still restricted to such peni-
tential communications as the clergyman is "in the course of the discipline or practice of
the church ... authorized or accustomed to hear." CAL. EVID, ConE § 1032 (West 2003). In
his study on behalf of the California Law Revision Commission that led to the final version
of the Evidence Code, Professor James H. Chadbourn explained, "The definition of 'peni-
tential communication' has been revised so that it is no longer necessary to determine the
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This broader clergy privilege did not explicitly require a confession or
penitential communication. Rather, it provided privilege protection
to a broader category of communications usually related to spiritual
advice.
The most influential of the code models which propagated the
new privilege was the Federal Rules of Evidence, which set forth the
new privilege in proposed Rule 506. 23
 Although Congress did not ap-
prove the privilege provisions of the Federal Rules, including that
contained in Rule 506, many of these privilege provisions were
influential in both the federal and state courts and in the state legisla-
tures.24
Proposed Federal Rule 506, which has been the model for the
type of clergy privilege adopted in a large number of states, provided:
"A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent another
from disclosing a confidential communication by the person to a
clergyman in his professional character as a spiritual adviser." 23
The Advisory Committee's note to Rule 506 highlights the differ-
ence between a confessional privilege and the spiritual-advice privi-
lege provided in Proposed Rule 506:
The definition of "confidential" communication is consistent
with the use of the term ... for lawyer-client [privilege] and
... for psychotherapist-patient, suitably adapted to commu-
nications to clergymen.
The choice between a privilege narrowly restricted to doc-
trinally required confessions and a privilege broadly applica-
ble to all confidential communications with a clergyman in
his professional character as spiritual adviser has been exer-
cised in favor of the latter. Many clergymen now receive
training in marriage counseling and the handling of person-
ality problems. Matters of this kind fall readily into the realm
of the spirit. The same considerations which underlie the
content of the statement; a court need determine only that the communication was made in
the presence of the priest only and that the priest has a duty to keep the communication
secret." CAL. LAW REVISION COMM O N, TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION AND A STUDY RELAT-
ING To Tit E UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 249 (1964).
23
 Fri). R. Evm, 506, 56 F.R.D. 183, 247 (1972) (unenacted). Also, in 1974, the
NCCUSL published a revised version of the Uniform Rules of Evidence that generally
tracked the Federal Rules and, with slight word changes, adopted as Rule 505 the same
privilege as proposed Federal Rule 506. UNIF. R. Evm. 505, available at latp://www.law.
upenn.edu/b11/u1c/fnact99/ure88.htm.
24 See FED. R. Evil). 506, 56 F.R.D. 183, 247 (1972) (unenacted).
21 Id. (tnenacted).
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psychotherapist-patient privilege ... suggest a broad applica-
tion of the privilege for communications to clergymen. 26
The notion of a spiritual advice counseling privilege opens the
door to a wide range of communications relating to all types of per-
sonal problems. Even though the advice may have spiritual content,
the advice may also include psychological and common sense ele-
ments, similar to the advice provided by other kinds of counseling
functionaries. In the absence of a religious requirement to seek such
advice, the spiritual advice counseling privilege, separately viewed, is
quite different in form, content and rationale from the confessional-
penitential privilege.27 The dramatic switch in approach to this area of
law seems to have occurred within the twenty-odd year period be-
tween the promulgation of the original Uniform Rules of Evidence in
1953, and the revision of those Rules in 1974 and promulgation of the
Federal Rules in 1975, 28
B. The Modern Clergy Privilege Statutes
1. A Survey of Modern Clergy Privilege Statutes
The clergy privilege statutes that succeeded the earlier confes-
sional privilege statutes have taken several forms. A survey of current
state statutes establishing the clergy privilege reveals the following
breakdown.29 Thirty-three of the fifty states have adopted privilege
provisions that include "spiritual advice."39 Twenty of these states,
many following very closely the pattern of the Federal Rules, provide
only for a privilege covering spiritual advice (referred to herein as
28 Id. at 248 (advisory committee's note) (unenacted).
27 See infra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
28 We can only guess at the causes of this dramatic change. It may have reflected the
coming of age in the country of a host of religious denominations, with different practices
and doctrines. Or it may be that the argument that providing only a confessional privilege
favored some religions over others and raised constitutional questions had begun to gain
adherents. Possibly, judicial decisions relating to freedom of religion and establishment
issues may have influenced the drafters. There is the related concern that providing a
privilege that was available only to some religious denominations was not politically wise or
acceptable. Finally, the switch in approaches may have reflected the particular views of the
drafters of these codes. Whatever the explanation, the strong influence of the Federal
Rules as a model, backed up by the similar approach in the new Uniform Rules, clearly
helped to spread the new approach through much of the country.
29 In classifying the statutes according to these categories, I have ignored specific word
differences among the statutes and focused only on the essential nature of the privilege
described in the statutory language.
88 See infra notes 31-32.
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spiritual-advice jurisdictions). 3 ' Thirteen of the thirty-three jurisdic-
tions expressly provide in a single statutory section for a privilege for
both "confessions" and communications relating to "spiritual advice"
(referred to herein as side-by-side jurisdictions)." Another seven
states may be treated separately or may be included in the spiritual-
advice category. 33
 They do not actually use the words "spiritual advice"
or the equivalent, but rather generally cover confidential communica-
tions to a clergy person in his or her professional capacity, which sug-
gests the possibility of an even more broadly applicable privilege. Fi-
nally, ten states, adhering to the original, pre-Federal Rules approach,
provide statutory clergy privilege protection only for a "confession .
in the course of discipline enjoined by the church" or equivalent lan-
guage.34
Even in states that still follow the pre-Federal Rules approach,
some of their state courts have interpreted their respective privilege
statutes to include spiritual advice. For example, in an influential de-
cision, the Supreme Court of Utah held in 1994 in Scott v. Hammock
that to fall within the statute which restricts the privilege to "any con-
fession" communications to clergy only requires that "they be made in
31 See ALASKA R. Lyn). 506; ARK. R. Eva). 505; DEL. R. Evm, 505; Ft.a. STAT. ch . 90.505
(2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-22 (2003); Haw. R. Evto. 506; Ky. R. Evin. 505; LA. ConE
Evin. ANN. art. 511; ME. R. Evin. 505; Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 27-506 (2002); N.M. R. Evil). 11-506; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (2003); N.D. R. EVID. 505;
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-17 (Michie 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-206 (2003); TEX. R.
Evil). 505; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400 (Michie 2003); W. VA. CODE § 48-1-301 (2003); Wis.
STAT. § 905.06 (2003).
32 See ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (2003); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-803 (2003); IND. CODE
§ 34-46-3-1 (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-429 (2002); Mn. CODE ANN., CTS. & Jun. PROC.
§ 9-111 (2003); MASS. GEN. Laws ch. 233, § 20A (2003); MINN, STAT. § 595.02(c) (2002);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.060(4) (2003); N.H. R. EVID. 505; NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23 (West
2003); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 (Consol. 2003); Onto REV. CODE. ANN. § 2317.02(C) (Anderson
2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-23 (2002). Those statutes that have enacted a rule modeled
after Federal Rule 506 do not, arguably, really differ in legal effect from those that adopt a
side-by-side approach. A formulation cast in terms of confidential communications relat-
ing to spiritual advice is broad enough also to encompass the confessional, as a require-
ment of confessional observance necessarily also involves the seeking of spiritual advice
and counsel.
" See Cow. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107 (2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146b (2003); IOWA
CODE § 622.10 (2002); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2505 (2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.260 (2001);
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5943 (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-90 (Law. Co-op. 2002).
34 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 12-2233, 13-4062 (2003); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1032, 1033;
InAlto CODE § 9-203 (Michie 2003); Micit. COMP. Laws § 600.2156 (2003); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 26-1-804 (2003); NEV. REV. STAT. 49.255 (2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (2002);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1607 (2002); %Vasil. REV. CODE § 5.60.060 (2003); Wvo. STAT.
ANN. § 1-12-101 (Michie 2002). California is classified here as a confessional state, but that
characterization is debatable. See supra note 22.
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confidence and for the purpose of seeking or receiving religious
guidance, admonishment, or advice and that the cleric be acting in
his or her religious role pursuant to the practice and discipline of the
church."5 The court further stated, IT] he term 'confession' as used
in the statute does not take its meaning from the course of discipline
of any one church, but rather depends for its meaning on the course
of discipline of the church of the cleric.""
This brief survey documents the strong trend away from the nar-
rowly applicable statutes that limit the privilege to confessional com-
munications and toward a broader privilege that includes spiritual
advice. Even in those jurisdictions that still only refer to confessional
communications, judicial decisions may be swinging in favor of
broadened interpretations of the statutory language.
2. Retention of the Confessional Privilege in the Modern Privilege
Statutes
What is striking about the results of this survey is that almost one-
third of the states retain a reference to the confessional privilege
as 870 P.2d 947, 956 (Utah 1994). Scott has been cited and followed in a number of the
confession states. See People v. Mackinnon, 957 P.2d 23, 27-28 (Mont. 1998) (concluding
that "Utah's broader interpretation of the clergy-penitent privilege as set forth in Scott . . .
is the better view, and we adopt that approach"); State v. Martin, 975 P.2d 1020, 1026 &
nn.65, 66, 69, 73 (Wash. 1999) ("determination of the definition of 'confession' referred
to ... is to be made by the church of the clergy member"). For an early broad reading of
"confession" (but not as broad as Scott), see In re Swenson, 237 N.W. 589, 590 (Minn. 1931).
as Scott, 870 P.2d at 951. The church involved in the Scott case was the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints, and as an intervenor in the litigation, the Church argued
that whether or not formal penitential confessions are required by a denomi-
nation, the role of a cleric in providing spiritual guidance and counseling
cannot properly be limited to formal confessions and the law ought to recog-
nize that fact.... Indeed ... according to its course of discipline, it is impos-
sible to separate a specific "penitential confession" from the process of pro-
viding religious and spiritual counseling, guidance, and admonishment
intended to persuade a church member to forsake and make amends for
wrongful conduct.
Id.
The court invoked free exercise of religion concerns in support of its interpretation,
and, most significantly, noted that "[a] broad construction of the clergy-penitent privilege
is also consistent with the purpose of its secular analogue, the psychotherapist-patient
privilege." Id. at 954. The court also called attention to the fact that it had promulgated
rules of evidence in 1992 under its rulemaking power which were not applicable to the
Scott case but which were much broader than the clergy privilege provided by the statute.
Id, at 950 n.2.
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along with the spiritual-advice privilege." This may reflect a tipping of
the legislative hat to the prior history, or may be recognition that the
confessional context is very important in this area of the law. Perhaps,
too, it indicates a desire to preserve a separate identity for the confes-
sional privilege, or acknowledges that many religions have a confes-
sional dimension to their religious practice. As discussed below, this
retention of the confessional language makes it easier to draw a dis-
tinction between confessional and spiritual-advice communications
for some purposes."
3. Retention of the Religious Compulsion Requirement in Modern
Statutes
It may be useful here to make another type of comparison among
the various state privilege statutes. Most of the confessional privilege
statutes refer to "confessions made ... in the course of discipline en-
joined by the church to which he belongs ... ," or some equivalent
phrasing. 39
 This phrasing goes back to the Phillips case and the New
York statute enacted in its wake. 4° Such phrasing suggests that the
communicator and the communicatee are functioning in accordance
with religious compulsion. Many states, however, do not use a "disci-
pline" phrase in their privilege statutes. 41
Of the spiritual-advice and side-by-side jurisdictions that do use a
discipline phrase, some use it in an ambiguous manner. One extreme
example is Iowa, which adds a discipline qualifier to a list of covered
professionals. The Iowa statute bars members of the clergy along with
other professionals such as attorneys, counselors, and physicians from
disclosing "any confidential communication ... necessary and proper
to enable the person to discharge the functions of the person's office
according to the usual course of practice or discipline."42
In some side-by-side jurisdictions, the discipline language only
modifies the confessional, and not the spiritual-advice, component of
the statute.43 Used in this manner, the phrase probably has the same
significance that it has when attached to the confession component in
37
 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
38 See, e.g., Mass. GEN. LAWS Cll. 119, § 51A (2003) (limiting clergy members' duty to
report to confessions only).
33 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2233 (2003); MONT. COVE ANN. § 26-1-804 (2003).
40 See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
41 See, e.g., ALASKA R. Evil). 506; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146b (2003).
42
 IOWA CODE § 622.10 (2002).
" See, e.g., D.C. ConE ANN. § 14-309 (2003); IND. CODE § 3446-3-1 (2002).
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a confession-only state—that is, it merely reinforces the need for the
communication to be made under religious compulsion. Other side-
by-side jurisdictions use the discipline language in a way that makes it
unclear what exactly it modifies."
The privilege statutes in spiritual-advice jurisdictions typically re-
fer to communications made to a clergy person in his professional
character as spiritual adviser.* A few of these spiritual-advice jurisdic-
tions use the discipline language, but not in a manner that suggests a
requirement of religiously compelled confidentiality.*
In addition, variations in judicial interpretation of the discipline
phrase compound this confusion. One possible interpretation is that
both the communicator and communicatee must be operating under
religiously imposed discipline for the privilege to be applicable. An-
other interpretation, as announced in 1999 by the Supreme Court of
Washington in State v. Martin, is that only the clergy member, not the
penitent, need be acting under religious compulsion 47
Some states, however, use language that successfully eliminates
this kind of ambiguity. For example, California refers to "a communi-
cation made in confidence ... to a member of the clergy who, .. .
under the discipline or tenets of his or her church, ... has a duty to
keep those communications secret."*
There are other ambiguities and uncertainties regarding the re-
ligious compulsion feature of the privilege. When tied to confessional
communications, given the history, the discipline language calls to
mind the Roman Catholic approach that makes confession a matter
of religious obligation and that treats as sinful any disclosure of con-
fessional communications. Such language, when tied to a spiritual-
advice clause, does not however, carry with it a similarly specific con-
notation, and so its meaning is more uncertain. To qualify for privi-
lege coverage under such language, must disclosure be prohibited by
religious doctrine and be deemed a "religious transgression," or is it
sufficient that the ethics or professional rules of the particular minis-
try prohibit disclosure (which, of course, would make it much more
akin to the professional ethics rules of the legal and medical profes-
sions)?
" See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAY'. 5/8-803 (2003).
46 See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAws 19-13-17 (Michie 2003).
46 See, e.g., TI NN Cone ANN. § 24-1-206 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400 (Michie
2003).
47 975 P.2d at 1025-26; accord Scott, 870 P.2d at 955.
48 CAI,.	 CoDE § 1032 (West 2003).
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Generally, concern about the uncertainty of statutory meaning
does not cause any difficulty under spiritual-advice or side-by-side
statutes since such statutes cover both spiritual-advice and confes-
sional communications, and there is usually no need to distinguish
between the coverage of each. 49
 Only where the privilege protection is
limited to confessional communications is there often a need to de-
termine more precisely the meaning of the discipline language. 5°
C. A Survey of the Applicability of State Child Abuse Statutory Reporting
Requirements to the Clergy
Every state imposes some obligation to report suspected child
abuse. 5i The state statutes fall into four categories. Nineteen states list
the categories of professionals who have a mandatory obligation to
report suspected child abuse and include clergy in the listing. 52 Six
states list the categories of individuals required to report child abuse,
and although they do not include clergy in the list, they include a
catchall clause such as "any person" or "any other person" at either
the beginning or the end of the list, thus imposing a reporting obliga-
tion on everyone else in the community, including clergy. 53
 Ten other
jurisdictions reach the same result without providing a list of covered
individuals by imposing a reporting requirement on "any person" or
49 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
5° Thus in states that have confessional privilege statutes that have not been inter-
preted broadly, it may be necessary to determine the meaning of the "discipline" language.
Similarly, under one feature of my proposal, it will be necessary to put content into this
concept. See infra note 110 and accompanying text. Similarly, Professor Michael Cassidy
found it necessary to put specific content into his proposed gloss on the clergy-
communicant privilege. See R. Michael Cassidy, Sharing Sacred Secrets: Is It (Past) Time for a
Dangerous Person Exception to the Clergy-Penitent Privilege?, 44 W141. & MARY L. Rio/. 1627, 1697
(2003).
52 See infra notes 52-55.
52 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3620 (2003); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.7 (West 2003);
Colo. REV. STAT. § 19-3-304 (2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-101 (2003); 325 ILL, Comp.
STAT. 5/4 (2003); L.A. CHILD. CODE ANN, art. 603 (West 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. lit. 22,
§ 4011-A (West 2003); MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 51A (2003); Mien. COMP. LAWS
§ 722.623 (2003); MINN. STAT. § 626.556 (2002); MISS. Cook: ANN. § 43-21-353 (2003); Mo.
REV. SEAT. § 210.115 (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-201 (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 169-C:29 (2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-3 (Michie 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-
03 (2003); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6311 (2002); T•a. FAm. CODE ANN. § 261.101 (Vernon
2003); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-2 (2003).
55 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 903 (2003); FLA. STAT. ch . 39.201 (2003); IDAHO CODE
§ 16-1619 (Michie 2003); Kv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.030 (Michie 2002); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-711 (2002); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7103 (2002).
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an equivalent phrase." Filially, fifteen states list those required to re-
port. but do not include the clergy in the listing and do not have a
catchall clause in their reporting statute. 55 Thus, in almost one-third
of the states, there is no mandatory reporting obligation imposed on
the clergy, and no issue as to whether the reporting requirement ap-
plies to information obtained as a result of clergy-privileged commit-
ic ado n s.56
There are various possible explanations for the failure to include
clergy in those required to report. For example, one speculation is
that these states were unable to resolve the conflict between the re-
porting requirement and the privilege, and this concern dominated
their thinking. Another possible explanation is that these states did
not perceive clergy as fitting into the same categories as those who are
required to report. Lastly, the legislature may simply have been inat-
tentive to the possibility of including the clergy in the listing. What-
ever the explanation, the focus of this Article is on the thirty-five states
that do impose a reporting requirement on clergy. 57 The proposal
presented here, however, may also be of interest to the fifteen states
that presently do not impose a reporting duty on the clergy.
D. A Survey of Statutory Provisions Governing the Relationship Between. the
Clergy Privilege and the Obligation to Report Child Abuse
The thirty-five states that impose a reporting requirement on
clergy either through a specific listing or by using a catchall "any per-
son" approach can be further grouped into three categories. The
largest number of states—twenty-two—provide an express exception
from their reporting requirement for clergy-privileged information, 58
54 Sec IND. CoDE § 31-33-5-1 (2002); Mo. CODE ANN., FAm. I.Aw § 5-705 {2003); NEV.
REV. STAT. 202.882 (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10 (West 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-
301 (2003); OR. REV. STAr. § 419B.010 (2001); R.I. GEN. Laws § 40-11-3 (2002); TENN.
Coot ANN. § 374-403 (2003); UTAH Coin ANN. § 62A-4a-403 (2002); Wvo. STNE. ANN.
§ 14-3-205 (Michie 2002).
55 SEC ALA . ConE g 26-14-3 (2003); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020 (Michie 2003); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 12-12-507 (Michie 2003); GA. Com ANN. § 19-7-5 (2003); HAW. REV, SEAT. § 350-1.1
(2002); Iowa CODE § 232.69 (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1522 (2002); N.Y. Soc. SERV.
LAW § 413 (Consul. 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (Anderson 2003); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-7-510 (Law. Co-op. 2002); S.D. Contrtm LAWS § 26-8A-3 (Michie 2003); VT.
STAT. ANN. fit, 33, § 4913 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1509 (Michie 2003); WASH, REV.
Coot § 26-44.030 (2003); Wts. STAT. § 48.981 (2003).
56 See supm note 55.
57 See supm notes 52-54.
58 See ARIZ, REV. STAT. § 13-3620 (2003); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166(c)(1) (West 2003);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-304 (2) (aa) (II) (2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 909 (2003); FLA.
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Only six states abrogate the application of the clergy privilege to the
abuse reporting requirement (that is, the privilege does not operate
to protect the confidentiality of the relevant communications). 59 In
the remaining seven states, the issue of exception for, or abrogation
of, the clergy privilege is not dealt with by statute. 60
Where a statute imposes a reporting requirement on clergy with
no express exception for communications covered by the clergy privi-
lege or express abrogation of the same, whether clergy are required to
report otherwise-privileged information is left to the courts to decide.
Where there is an express exception for clergy-privileged information,
this exception takes various forms. In some statutes, the exception is
framed in broad terms, such as in the Maine statute, which states: "ex-
cept for information received in confidential communications [under
the cleric privilege]."o In some instances, the exemption is formu-
lated in the same terms as the terms of the privilege, such as "infor-
mation received in the capacity of a spiritual adviser."62
Spiritual-advice and side-by-side jurisdictions are among those
states that abrogate the privilege and require the clergy to report
child abuse. No confession-only state, however, has abrogated the
privilege in favor of the reporting requirement.° Rather, and not sur-
prisingly, most of the confession-only states provide an exception to
the reporting requirement for confessional communications.64 This
STAT. ch. 39.204 (2003); Immo Cone § 16-1619(c) (Michie 2003); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/4 (2003); Kv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.050(3) (Michie 2002); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art.
603(13)(6) (West 2003); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw §5-705; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 4011-A(1) (A) (27) (West 2003); MASS, GEN. LAws ch. 119, § 51A (2003); Micti. COMP.
LAWS § 722.631 (2003); MINN. STAT. § 626.556 subd. 3(a)(2) (2002); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 352.400 (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 4 1-3-201 (4) (b) (2003); Nev. REV. STAT. 202.888
(2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-3 (Michie 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-03(1)
(2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.010(1) (2001); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6311(a) (2002); UTAH
Cone ANN. § 62A-4a-403(2).
59
 N.H. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:32 (2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-301 (2003); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 10, § 7103(A) (3) (2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-11 (2002); Tex. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 261.101(c) (Vernon 2003); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-7 (2003).
6° CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-101 (2003); INn. CODE § 31-33-5-1 (2002); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 43-21-353 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-707(2) (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10 (West
2003); TENN. Cone ANN. § 37-1-411 (2003); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-205 (Michie 2002).
61 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22. § 4011-A(1)(A) (27).
62 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-03(1). North Dakota has another provision that
abrogates privileges in regard to the reporting requirement for privileges between any
professional person and the person's patient or client, with the exception of the attorney-
client privilege.
63 It is true, of course, that there are not very many abrogation states. See supra note 59.
64 Wyoming, a confession jurisdiction, does not provide an exception for confessional
communications. Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-205. Vermont and Washington, also confession
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seems to be the only correlation between the form of the clergy privi-
lege and the nature of the relationship between the obligation to re-
port and the privilege. Thus, no legislature has expressly provided
that its child abuse reporting requirement trumps the confessional
version of the clergy privilege. 65 Only in jurisdictions that include
spiritual advice within their privilege, or have an even broader clergy
privilege, has the application of the clergy privilege to child abuse re-
porting been abrogated.w
Most of the states that exclude clergy-privileged information
from the reporting requirement make the exception co-extensive with
the scope of the clergy privilege. Three states, however, do not fit this
pattern because their clergy privilege exception to the reporting re-
quirement applies only to confessional communications, whereas
their definition of the privilege itself is more broadly cast to include
spiritual advice. 67
states, do not provide an exception to the reporting requirement for confessional com-
munications because the clergy are not covered by the obligation to report. VT. STAT. ANN,
tit. 33, § 4913 (2002); WASH. REV. CODE § 26-44.030 (2003).
But see infra note 98 and accompanying text.
66 Compare supra note 59, with supra notes 31-32. Of course, spiritual-advice and
broader privileges also include by implication confessional communications within the
coverage of the privilege. The result is that the abrogation statutes in the child abuse re-
porting context do have the legal effect of abrogating the application of the privilege to
confessional communications as well as to spiritual-advice communications not involving
the confessional, even though that effect is not highlighted in the statutory language.
V? See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 909 (2003); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 603(13) (b)
(West 2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § MA (2003). The Massachusetts statutory scheme
requires further description. The clergy privilege provision has two parts: any disclosure of
confessional communications, without the consent of the communicant, is prohibited;
there is a separate prohibition against testifying as to spiritual-advice communications.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20A. The reporting statute exempts confessional material or
"similarly confidential communication in other religious faiths." Id. ch. 119, § 51A. If the
spiritual-advice provision, though framed in terms of testifying, applies to the reporting
context, then it is abrogated while confessional communications are exempted. If the spiri-
tual-advice privilege is not applicable in the reporting context, then there is anyway an
obligation to report information communicated in the spiritual-advice context. As to the
question of whether a privilege that is framed in terms of "testifying" or is applicable to
"proceedings" or has some similar frame of reference applies at all in the reporting con-
text, compare Mary Harter Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Reporting Versus the Clergy
Privilege and Free Exercise of Religion, 71 MINN. L. REV. 723, 786-89 (1987), with Robert P.
Mosteller, Child Abuse Reporting Laws and Attorney-Client Confidences: The Reality and the Specter
of Lawyer as Informant, 42 Dula L.J. 203, 224-26 (1992) (examining whether the attorney-
client privilege applies to out-of-court disclosures).
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II. A HYPOTHESIS TO EXPLAIN THE VARIATION IN STATE APPROACHES
TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE OBLIGATION TO
REPORT AND THE CLERGY PRIVILEGE
The variation in approaches to the relationship between the ob-
ligation to report child abuse and the confidentiality afforded by the
clergy privilege is remarkable. It is striking that in many states the
clergy privilege trumps the obligation to report; in others, a fewer
number to be sure, the obligation to report trumps the privilege; and
in a third group, the question of the relationship is not answered-in
the statute. 68
What might account for such diametrically opposed approaches
to this important public policy issue? The most obvious explanation is
that different states place different values on the matters at issue. In
those states where the reporting requirement trumps the privilege,
one might assume those states place a higher value on preventing
child abuse.69
 In states where the opposite occurs, one might infer
that a relatively lower value is placed on the need to report child
abuse than on the protection of clergy-privileged communications.
Initially, it appears that the number of states that place a higher
value on the clergy privilege outnumber those that place the higher
value on the need for reporting child abuse by a factor of three to
one." This seems odd given the great public concern about child
abuse, the prevailing and clearly sound notion that children need
protection against this scourge, the incidence of child abuse in clergy-
related situations, and the fact that a need for a strong child abuse
reporting obligation has been uniformly recognized in this country.
This paradox suggests that one cannot explain the variation in
approaches through general comparisons between the relative values
placed on the matters at issue. Indeed, it seems reasonable to assume
that the value placed on preventing child abuse probably does not
vary significantly in different parts of the country. Accordingly, my
hypothesis is that the variation in approaches relates to the privilege
side of the relationship and that the subject is more complicated than
it initially appears.
Thus, my speculation has two parts. The first is: a) that the dia-
metrically opposed positions among the states result in part from the
breadth of the clergy privilege in most of the states—the fact that it
66 See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
69 See Cassidy, supra note 50, at 1672.
70 Compare supra note 58, with supra note 59.
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covers both confessional communications and spiritual-advice coun-
seling, the latter not covered by the requirements of religious doc-
trine; and b) that if the privilege were limited to confessional com-
munications protected by religious law, there would be much less
variation in the state responses to the clergy privilege-child abuse re-
porting tension. Second, even if only spiritual-advice communications
were required to be reported, there would still be a problem because
abuser-perpetrators would be reluctant to communicate in confidence
in spiritual-advice settings because of a concern that their communi-
cations might subsequently be used against them in a criminal prose-
cution.
Inclusion of coverage of both confessional and spiritual-advice
communications in most state versions of the clergy privilege creates a
dilemma for those states that wish to subordinate only spiritual-advice
communications, and not confessional communications, to their child
abuse reporting requirements." What is a state to do if its clergy privi-
lege covers both forms of communications? One should not be sur-
prised in that circumstance that the unsatisfactory choice between
abrogation or creating an exception to the reporting requirement has
produced an odd result. Some states have abrogated the privilege,
some states have carved out an exception to their reporting require-
ments, and some states have punted and failed to resolve the issue. 72
Are there grounds for concluding that the confessional commu-
nication form of the clergy privilege is viewed differently from the
spiritual-advice counseling form in the child abuse reporting context?
I believe there are some grounds for such a conclusion although ad-
mittedly one is forced to rely on reasonable speculation and circum-
stantial evidence.
It is easier to justify a clergy privilege exception to child abuse
reporting requirements for confessional communications than for
spiritual-advice communications. This is because absent such an ex-
clusion for confessional communications, a state, through its courts,
could order a clergy person or parishioner to testify to such commu-
nications—that is, to engage in conduct that violates his religious be-
liefs." Although impositions on religious practice are permissible in
some contexts, a direct imposition of this sort smacks of religious per-
71 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
72 See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
79 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text for a description of People a Phillips.
1144
	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 44:1127
secution.74
 One can construct a First Amendment argument against
imposing such an obligation, although the existing United States Su-
preme Court precedents make the success of this argument uncer-
tain. 75
The argument in support of protecting spiritual advice counsel-
ing communications by a privilege may take a slightly different form.
Although a First Amendment argument can also be constructed in
support of non-restriction of a spiritual-advice privilege, it would be a
weaker argument than in the confessional communication context.
Imposing an obligation on the clergy to report child abuse informa-
tion that is gained through spiritual-advice sessions usually does not,
by hypothesis, involve trying to force individuals to engage in conduct
that violates religiously imposed obligations.
Another line of argument focuses on the similarity of the spiri-
tual-advice version of the clergy privilege and other professional rela-
tionship privileges. 7° As suggested by the drafters of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, the spiritual-advice version particularly resembles the
privilege applicable to the psychotherapist-patient or psychologist (or
74
 This form of argument touches, of course, on First Amendment free exercise issues,
but it can also be made independent of any constitutional claim. The California Supreme
Court captured this justification for the religious doctrine-bound privilege in In re Lifschutz:
Realistically, the statutory privilege must be recognized as basically an explicit
accommodation by the secular state to strongly held religious tenets of a large
segment of its citizenry.... Wigmore, in his treatise, similarly relates the pur-
pose of the privilege in a question and answer format: -Does the penitential
relation deserve recognition and countenance? In a state where toleration of
religion exists by law, and where a substantial part of the community professes
a religion practising a confessional system, this question must be answered in
the affirmative."
85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 837 (1970).
76
 For an elaboration of the First Amendment free exercise argument, see infra notes
102-110 and accompanying text. The First Amendment argument would apply equally
where criminal sanctions are invoked against the clergy person who fails to fulfill the obli-
gation to report.
76 Those privileges are commonly argued to be based on an instrumental justification.
The application of an instrument.] notion—that the privilege is needed to encourage
individuals to be willing to communicate—makes little sense in a context where a parish-
ioner is required by his or her religious beliefs to communicate about his or her sins.
Where the communication is religiously compelled, we assume that religiously observant
persons will communicate to the priest or minister whether or not an evidentiary privilege
is applicable. In another article, I have criticized the instrumental justification as it works
in practice and proposed a new approach to professional relationship evidentiary privi-
leges, but still in reliance on the same general type of instrumental justification. Norman
Abrams, Unpacking the Power of an Ante-Litigation Limitation on Advice/Treatment-client/Patient
Evidentiary Privileges, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1089 (2003).
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other mental health professional)-patient relationships. 77 It is note-
worthy that most states impose an obligation to report child abuse on
mental health professionals including physicians, who, as a general
group are required to report. under the state statutes, and the report-
ing statute does not exempt communications that fall under the phy-
sician-patient privilege and the psychotherapist privilege." Thus, if a
state creates an exception to its child abuse reporting obligation for
spiritual advice counseling communications, this opens the door to an
argument in favor of providing a similar exemption for psychological
counseling communications." To avoid such argument, it would be
better to treat. spiritual-advice communications similarly to other
counseling relationships.
Finally, there is circumstantial corroboration of the higher value
given to the protection of privileged confessional communications.
First, the fact that ten states still limit the clergy privilege to confes-
sional communications and do not abrogate the privilege in the child
abuse reporting context, 813 and the fact that three states restrict their
exception to the mandatory child abuse reporting to privileged con-
fessional communications despite the fact that their clergy privilege includes
coverage of spiritual-advice communicationsfm confirms that, at least in
those states, privileged confessional information is viewed as meriting
higher protection. Second, although initially it appears that exemp-
tion of spiritual-advice counseling from the child abuse reporting
statutes is a very strong majority position among the states, on closer
examination, the numbers appear quite different. Thus, of the twenty-
two states that expressly exempt information covered by the clergy
privilege from the child abuse reporting requirement, seven of those
twenty-two are states whose clergy privilege only covers confessional
comnmnications. 82 Further, of the fifteen states remaining from the
twenty-two whose privilege statutes cover spiritual advice counseling
77 See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
is See, e.g., Mnss. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 51A (2003); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.101
(Vernon 2003).
79 See generally Michael Keel, Law and Religion Collide Again: The Priest-Penitent Privi-
lege in Child Abuse Reporting Cases, 28 Cums. L. KEv. 681 (1997), which addresses the consti-
tutional issues raised by a state statutory scheme requiring child abuse to be reported by a
psychotherapist but not by a member of the clergy engaged in a spiritual-advice counseling
role.
917 See supra note 34.
91 Sec supra note 67.
+32 The clergy privilege and child abuse reporting statutes in Arizona, California, Idaho,
Michigan, Montana, Nevada and Utah have this relationship. Compare supra note 34, with
supra note 58.
1146	 Boston College Law Review
	
[Vol. 44:1127
information, three of these narrow the exception to confessional
communications.83
 Thus, if one puts the aforementioned seven states
whose clergy privilege only covers confessional communications to-
gether with the three states, which although they are spiritual-advice
jurisdictions, provide only for an exception to the reporting require-
ment for confessional communications, ten states of the original
twenty-two exempt only confessional communications from the obli-
gation to report.84
 Twelve states do exempt spiritual advice or
confidential communication information, rubrics that are broad
enough also to include confessional communications. 86
Although these elaborated numbers show that carving out an ex-
ception to the obligation to report child abuse for spiritual-advice in-
formation is not an especially widespread position, they do not reduce
the impression that the states are in a quandary about how to resolve
the child abuse reporting-clergy privileged communications relation-
ship. 86
III. ATTEMPTING TO RESOLVE THE QUANDARY
A. The Argument for Some Uniformity and Consistency Among the States
The variation in approaches among the jurisdictions is remark-
able for another reason: this is a specific area of the law where there
are strong arguments in favor of having a reasonable amount of con-
sistency and uniformity among the states. Clergy are members of one
of the most mobile professions in the United States. 87 Many clergy are
employed by, or are the agents of, large religious organizations that
have the authority to, and do, transfer clergy from pulpit to pulpit
around the country. Even clergy not employed by a large organization
often move from city to city, usually to larger and larger churches or
synagogues.
83
 See supra note 67.
84 See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
85
 These states are Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Maine, Minnesota,
Missouri, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon and Pennsylvania. See supra note 58 and
accompanying text.
86 The concerns reflected in the foregoing analysis may be the kind of concerns that
the drafters of the original Uniform Rules of Evidence had in mind when they commented
that a rule broader than the confessional privilege would 'open the door to abuse and
would clearly not be in the public interest." See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
81
 Among the many occupations that are required to report, there may be some others
that have a similar peripatetic feature, but I have not identified any place where that fea-
ture is combined with privilege-reporting rules that vary so markedly.
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Given an obligation to report that varies markedly from state to
state, this kind of mobility puts special burdens on the clergy member
to learn new law every time he or she moves. Further, it is likely to be
disconcerting for a clergy member to learn that in one jurisdiction
there may be an obligation to report child abuse communications
even though communicated within the traditional privilege, while in
the next, there may be no such obligation, and still in a third, the
question of whether there is such an obligation is unclear. Running
into such diaMetrically opposed rules is likely to breed a sense that
the law is indeed a fickle mistress.
The mobility of clergy poses additional problems when the per-
petrator is a member of the clergy. For the confidee clergy member,
the issue after a move to another jurisdiction is whether he is required
to report, and for the confiding clergy person, the question is: Dare I
confide? As suggested below, the willingness to confide may be af-
fected by the availability of the privilege and whether the disclosure
could trigger a duty to report.
The mobility of clergy also can add another dimension where the
state laws on the subject differ dramatically. Suppose the perpetrator
in state A, where no report is required, makes the confessing commu-
nication, but shortly thereafter, the clergy member to whom the in-
criminating communication was made in confidence is transferred to
state B, where there is an obligation to report? 88 Cases involving more
than one state where there is different coverage of the privilege and
different reporting obligations applicable to the clergy can present
conflict of laws issues. Of course, there are always likely to be some
differences between state laws on such a subject. What is disturbing is
that the differences are not matters of detail but differences in the
basic rules. Thus, it would be desirable to have some general consis-
tency among the states in dealing with these issues.
Choosing an approach that. is acceptable to all states, given the
complexity of the matter, is a difficult task. The burden of the re-
mainder of this Article is to identify such an approach.
86
 For opinions in a case where a conflict of laws issue arose in a clergy-privilege set-
ting, but not involving child abuse reporting differences between the states, see Gonzalez v.
State, 45 S.W. 3d 101, 102-03 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) and Gonzalez v. State, 21 S.W. 3d 595,
596-97 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).
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B. Examination of Alternative Approaches
One way to identify a preferred position among the various state
approaches is to examine the approaches from the perspective of the
principal players, namely the abused child, the perpetrator of the
abuse, and the clergy person who receives the potentially privileged
communication.
1. Exemption of Clergy-privileged Communications from the
Reporting Requirement
The approach that provides an exception to the reporting re-
quirement for privileged communications certainly serves the interest
of the perpetrator: he or she can freely communicate without having
to worry that the communications may lead to criminal prosecution.
This approach is also attractive to the clergy member because the
clergy member does not have an obligation to report traditionally
privileged matters. Of course, this approach does not serve the inter-
est of the abused child. A potential source of information that might
lead to disclosure of the abuse is protected. Even though the authori-
ties may learn of the abuse from other sources, in many cases the per-
petrator will possibly be the only source from which disclosure and
the resulting official reporting and follow-up might initially come.
2. Full Abrogation of the Clergy Privilege
What about the opposite approach—one that abrogates the privi-
lege in the reporting context? This is neither the preferred approach
for the clergy person, who would be required by law to breach his or
her religiously compelled rules of confidentiality, nor the preferred
approach for the perpetrator, who could face disclosure of otherwise
confidential communications, resulting in possible criminal prosecu-
tion. Initially, however, this position does appear to serve the interest
of the abused child because the clergy member is required to report
otherwise-privileged communications made by the perpetrator.
Closer examination, however, raises some questions about
whether abrogation as such will in fact benefit the abused child. If the
perpetrator knows that the clergy person will be obligated to make a
report based on his or her communication, which in turn is likely to
lead to criminal prosecution, he or she would probably be unwilling
to make disclosures even in the context of the otherwise-privileged
relationship.
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If this prediction is correct, then the full abrogation rule is not
likely to serve the interest of the abused child. Perhaps in some con-
texts, the perpetrator may be overwhelmed by guilt or compelled by
the confessional obligations of his or her religion, and choose to dis-
close the abuse without regard to the consequences. Of course, in the
last-mentioned context, even though the statute abrogates the privi-
lege, where the religious order deems revealing privileged confes-
sional information to be sinful, the clergy person is unlikely to report
even if there is a legal obligation to do so. Therefore, under the full
abrogation approach, in many situations, either the perpetrator will
not disclose, or the clergy person will not report, despite the rule of
abrogation. The result is that a rule of full abrogation may not actu-
ally serve the interest of the child victim.
3. Partial Abrogation of the Privilege
There are two ways a state can partially abrogate the clergy privi-
lege in the child abuse reporting context. First, the partial abrogation
of the privilege can be applied only to the reporting requirement but
not to criminal proceedings. This is in contrast to "full abrogation,"
where the privilege is abrogated both with respect to the reporting
requirement and with respect to other proceedings involving allega-
tions of child abuse. A second type of partial abrogation refers to how
extensively the statute abrogates the substantive coverage of the privi-
lege—whether, for example, the abrogation extends to both spiritual
advice and confessional communications.
a. Partial Abrogation: Abrogation in the Reporting Context Only
A state might choose to abrogate the clergy privilege in the child
abuse reporting context only, and not abrogate the privilege for other
types of proceedings, such as criminal proceedings. Under such an
approach, the clergy member or the perpetrator could use the clergy
privilege to bar testimony in subsequent criminal proceedings, despite
the abrogation of the privilege as to the reporting requirement.
Six states have full abrogation provisions requiring the reporting
of child abuse information even where the information is derived
from communications that fall within the clergy privilege—New
Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas and
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West Virginia.89
 In these states, the abrogation extends to all proceed-
ings involving child abuse as well as to the reporting requirement.
Courts typically interpret statutes that abrogate the privilege in judi-
cial proceedings when child abuse is involved to include criminal tri-
alS.9°
Partial abrogation, however, would be a better approach than full
abrogation in these six states because the clergy privilege could be
invoked to bar testimony in subsequent criminal proceedings, despite
the abrogation of the privilege as to the reporting requirement and as
to other kinds of proceedings. 9' Thus, if a child abuse perpetrator
were to communicate in confidence to his priest or minister in a
manner that would normally be covered by the privilege, the priest or
minister would be obligated to report the information regarding child
abuse but that information could not subsequently be introduced at
the perpetrator's criminal trial. In effect, the privilege would be re-
vived, "brought back from abrogation," in a criminal proceeding in-
volving prosecution of the abuser despite the previous disclosure of
the information.92
What is the justification for this type of partial abrogation? Recall
that the weakness of the full abrogation approach is that the perpetra-
tor, knowing that the reporting statute abrogates the privilege, is un-
likely to make the disclosures to a clergy member, so that in practice,
a full abrogation rule would not really serve the interest of the abused
child. By reinstating the privilege for the criminal proceeding, the
perpetrator receives some privilege protection, not so much as he
would receive if the privilege was fully applicable, but more than he
a9 See supra note 59. Idaho, in what surely must be a result of legislative inattention,
does not abrogate the clergy privilege in regard to reporting suspected child abuse but
does abrogate with respect to judicial proceedings involving child abuse. IDAHO CODE § 16-
1619 (Michie 2003).
9° See, e.g., Bordman v. State, 56 S.W. 3d 63, 67-68 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (applying TEX.
FAN!. CODE ANN. § 261.202).
SL Wyoming is an interesting state in this respect. The Wyoming child abuse reporting
statute does not address the clergy privilege issue, so it is unclear whether it is an abroga-
tion or exemption state as to the reporting requirement. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-205 (Mi-
chic 2002). Another provision, however, makes evidence "regarding a child in any judicial
proceeding" subject to exclusion if it concerns confession made to [the clergy person]
in his professional character if enjoined by the church to which he belongs." Id. §§ 1-12-
101, 143-210. The Wyoming statute thus comes closest to being a statutory model for the
form of partial abrogation being proposed here, but it is distinguishable because the stat-
ute does not provide that the clergy privilege is abrogated as to the child abuse reporting
obligation.
92
 Issues can be raised as to how far the privilege door would be closed in the criminal
proceedings. These questions are addressed in Part IV.
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would receive under the full abrogation approach. Is that likely to
diminish the reluctance of the perpetrator otherwise to communi-
cate? I believe so.
Of course, some perpetrators may still be deterred from commu-
nicating to their clergy person and triggering a child abuse report be-
cause they are unwilling to face any kind of public exposure or be-
cause they fear the non-criminal, administrative consequences that
may flow from their disclosures. Still, by reinstating the privilege with
respect to criminal proceedings, more perpetrators will be encour-
aged to communicate than would otherwise be the case." This then is
a middle ground designed to encourage comnmnications regarding
child abuse and gaining many of the benefits that flow from official
reporting of this information.
Will this approach adequately protect the interest of the abused
child? It will not provide maximum protection for the child, but at a
minimum, the child is identified, the authorities can treat the child,
remove the child from risk and ensure that the perpetrator is re-
moved from any situation that puts children at risk. The only omission
is that the communication cannot be used at a subsequent criminal
trial. Remember, though, it may be possible to convict the perpetrator
based on evidence other than that derived from the privileged com-
munications.
This proposed resolution of the tension between the
confidentiality of the privilege and the desire to protect abused chil-
dren is a compromise, not a perfect accommodation of the two sets of
values. It is, however, likely to provide more protection to the interest
of the abused child than the full abrogation or the exemption ap-
proach.
b. Partial Abrogation: Abrogation for Spiritual-advice Communications Only
As previously described, partial abrogation may refer to abroga-
tion of the clergy privilege only for spiritual-advice communications in
the reporting context, whereas the privilege is preserved for confes-
sional communications.
95 it should be emphasized that what is being proposed is the recognition of the clergy
privilege that would otherwise have been applicable in the criminal proceeding, if there
had not been an abrogation of the privilege under the child abuse reporting statute. The
proposal does not extend the clergy privilege so much as it prevents the child abuse re-
porting obligation from having the consequence of making the privilege inapplicable in
the criminal proceeding.
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In three states, as described above, the statutory clergy privilege
covers both spiritual advice and confessional communications, yet the
exemption from the reporting requirement covers only the latter. 94 In
other words, clergy must only report communications that involve
spiritual advice and need not report communications from religious
confessions.
As suggested earlier, concern about treating spiritual advice and
confessional communications similarly has been one of the reasons
why the states have found themselves in a quandary and have ended
up with different statutory approaches. Further, in contexts where the
clergy person who hears the confession is enjoined from disclosure by
religious doctrine, it makes little sense to abrogate the privilege and
require that child abuse information be reported. The compulsion of
religious law is likely to overcome the compulsion of civil or criminal
laws. In such a circumstance, government officials are placed in a di-
lemma: either they attempt to enforce the law and end up trying to
put a priest or minister in jail, or they leave the law unenforced. Typi-
cally, in this type of situation, they leave the law unenforced. The
Texas experience is illustrative.
Texas abrogates the privilege in the reporting context. 95 The
Texas clergy privilege statute, modeled after the proposed Federal
Rule of Evidence 506, applies to spiritual-advice communications.96
The Texas child abuse reporting statute sweeps broadly and provides:
The requirement to report ... applies without exception to an indi-
vidual whose personal communications may otherwise be privileged,
including ... a member of the clergy." 97
 In a 1985 opinion, the Texas
Attorney General interpreted a statute of similar import, concluding
that a minister of an established church is required to report evidence
of child abuse when confidentially disclosed to him by a parishioner,
" See supra note 67. The result is that these states can be put in the exemption cate-
gory (partial exemption), or in the abrogation category (partial abrogation), because the
fact that only some otherwise-privileged communications are exempted by the privilege
from having to be reported leaves other otherwise-privileged communications which must
be reported.
w5 TEX. FAN. CODE ANN. § 261.101(c) (Vernon 2003); see supra notes 25-26. Also wor-
thy of note is Washington, which provides that conduct involved in reporting is not to be
deemed in violation of any privilege. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.060(3) (2003). The Wash-
ington clergy privilege applies only to confessional communications.
96 TEX. R. Evil). 505.
97 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.101(c).
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even when the knowledge conies from information communicated in
the confessional.98
Not surprisingly, there have 'been no reported prosecutions in
Texas of clergy for failing to report child abuse, it seems unlikely that
police will attempt to enforce the provision against clergy who have
received the information in the confessional where religious doctrine
prohibits the clergy person from disclosing the communication .99
There is another reason for not abrogating the privilege with re-
spect to confessions, disclosure of which would violate the clergy per-
son's religious obligations. Were a reporting requirement like the
Texas statute enforced against clergy, particularly concerning infor-
mation received in a religious confessional context, it would raise a
question whether it was violative of the First Amendment.
Until recently, the U.S. Supreme Court's multi-pronged free ex-
ercise test, as articulated in Sherbert v. Verner and Thomas v. Review
Board, would be the applicable precedent for this First Amendment
challenge.m Today, however, this same case would be analyzed under
the Court's more recent decisions in Employment Division v. Smith and
City of Boerne v. Flores.m
The Court held in Smith in 1990 that the Free Exercise Clause
does not protect religiously motivated behavior that conflicts with a
valid and neutral law of general applicability. 102 Under this reasoning,
the government does not have to demonstrate a compelling interest
nor that it has adopted the least restrictive means)" Similarly, in
Boerne, the Court in 1997 held unconstitutional the Federal Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, which was a legislative attempt to overrule
Smith by statute and reinstate the compelling interest standard)"
Thus, if a child abuse reporting statute applies to all, including
clergy members, and applies to all clergy communications, including
98 Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-342 (1985). See. Shannon O'Malley, At All Costs: Manda-
toiy Child Abuse Reporting Statutes and the Clergy-Communicant Privilege, 21 RF.V. /ATM. 701,
706-07 (2002).
" Prosecutions are more likely to occur in nonconfessional and, of course, in unprivi-
leged contexts. See, e.g., People v. Hodges, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 412, 414-16 (1992) (prosecu-
tion of protestant ministers for failing to report child abuse where information received
from victim appeared not to have been received in a privileged context).
100 Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
403 (1963).
101 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512-14, 536 (1997); Employment Division v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884-90 (1990),
"2 494 U.S. at 872-73.
103 Id. at 873.
too
	 521 U.S. at 507-08, 536.
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traditionally privileged communications, even those involving well-
recognized, religiously required functions, it would seem to qualify as
neutral and generally applicable, .and therefore would be constitu-
tional, under the Smith-Boerne reasoning."15
 The matter, however, is
not free from doubt. 10° The proposal presented here, to maintain the
privilege and exempt confessional communications from the obliga-
tion to report, would serve to avoid a difficult constitutional question
and the controversy that would ensue, whichever way the decision
wen t. 1 °7
One final issue to resolve in connection with this proposal is what
are the characteristics of a confessional communication? Generally, a
confessional communication has three principal attributes: it involves
confessional or penitential communications; it is required by religious
obligation; and the clergy member is barred by religious obligation
from disclosing the communication to anyone in any setting. Should
the exemption from the reporting requirement under the proposal
include all three of these attributes?
Under some statutes, comm unications that are privileged as relig-
iously obligated extend beyond confessional material.w 8 Given a pur-
105 See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text.
106 There may be a question, however, whether the "neutral and generally applicable"
standard is met where the reporting obligation is imposed on a list of named professions
that includes the clergy profession. There may be a further question about the applicabil-
ity of Smith and Boerne if another constitutional claim is raised. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 872-73
("The only decisions in which this Court has held that the First Amendment bars applica-
tion of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action are distinguished
on the ground that they involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but that Clause in
conjunction with other constitutional protections."). Compelled speech is involved here
because legislation that abrogates the privilege for child abuse reporting purposes requires
that reports be made in specified circumstances with criminal sanctions imposed for fail-
ing to report. Hence, there is at least some basis for raising a freedom of speech concern.
107
 Of course, exempting religiously protected confessional communications or the
like may pose an establishment issue. See infra notes 113-127 and accompanying text.
108
 See, for example, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 51A (2003), which provides for an
exemption to the reporting requirement for information gained solely in a confession or
similarly confidential communication in other religious faiths"; see also the Maryland stat-
utes which contain an additional ambiguity: through a combination of two provisions, the
exemption applies to "any confession or communication made ... in confidence by a per-
son seeking ... spiritual advice or consolation" where the "clergyman ... is bound to
maintain the confidentiality of that communication under canon law, church doctrine, or
practice." Mn. CODE ANN., CTS. & Jun. PRoc. § 9.111 (2003); Mn. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW
§ 5-705 (2003). This provision would seem to exempt from the reporting requirement
confessional communications whose confidentiality is protected by religious obligation. Is
the exemption similarly limited as to spiritual-advice communications? The answer would
seem to be yes, unless the term "practice" is given a broad construction, which is a possibil-
ity.
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pose of avoiding the creation of an obligation to report child abuse
that is essentially unenforceable because religious doctrine prohibits
reporting, the main test for this category of exemption should be
whether religious doctrine requires the clergy person to maintain the
confidentiality of the communication. 109 There are various statutory
approaches to draw upon in trying to ensure that there is a religious
basis for the confidentiality, For example, the Massachusetts approach
that restricts the exemption to "a confession or similarly confidential
communication in other religious faiths" not only ensures that the
criterion is not limited to one or two denominations but also, through
the use of the phrase, "similarly confidential," would seem to tie the
exemption to a type of communication whose confidentiality is man-
dated by religious doctrine. 11 °
There is, of course, an irony in proposing retention of the privi-
lege for religiously protected communications in connection with the
obligation to report child abuse. The operation of this aspect of the
proposal is likely to have its greatest impact on the obligation of Ro-
man Catholic clergy to report, and it is that denomination which
seems in recent days to be having the greatest problem with child
abuse and the sharing of information. The response to any expression
100 The California approach may accomplish this result, but the language is not abso-
lutely clear. See CAL. Elan. Cons § 1032 (West 2003) (defining penitential communication
as "a communication made in confidence .. to a member of the clergy who ... under the
discipline or tenets of his or her church, denomination, or organization has a duty to keep
those communications secret"). The problem is highlighted by the reference to the "disci-
pline or tenets of his or her ... organization." Id. Might rules of the church group that do
not have the force of religious doctrine be included in this category? If so, the obligation
of confidentiality begins to look more like rules of professional ethics than religiously
based rules. Perhaps the inclusion of the phrase "penitential communication" serves to
restrict the category to religiously protected communications. Recall Professor Chad-
bourn's explanation of the reason for the change from confession to penitential commu-
nication. See supra note 22.
no See MASS, GEN. LAws ch. 119, § 51A. Still another approach is proposed by Profes-
sor Cassidy. fie advocates abrogation of the clergy privilege where the clergy member has
"reasonable cause to believe that the individual ... intends to commit a future criminal act
causing death or serious bodily injury," but he would exempt from the abrogation a "peni-
tential communication," which he defines as a communication "made pursuant to the
recognized sacraments of the church for the purposes of spiritual absolution or forgive-
ness, provided that the clergy member is authorized under Canon law or church doctrine
to hear such communication and has a sacred duty under Canon law or church doctrine to
keep it secret." Sec Cassidy, supra note 50, at 1697-98. Although he is dealing with a differ-
ent problem and set of issues, his purpose is clearly to provide an exemption tied to an
obligation to maintain confidentiality based in religious doctrine, and for essentially the
same reasons as under this proposal. Still, because he has tied it so explicitly to the relig-
ious requirements of one or two religious denominations, it would seem more likely to be
vulnerable to constitutional challenge.
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of concern about carving out such an exception to the reporting ob-
ligation should be: a) as previously mentioned, the privilege has not
played a central role in the child abuse scandals that have surfaced;
and b) if we fail to recognize this exception, it will not lead to an in-
crease in the reporting of child abuse because clergy who receive in-
formation through religiously protected communications will not re-
port anyway.
4. Combining the Two Forms of Partial Abrogation
In trying to resolve the quandary faced by the states on this issue,
one thing is clear: an approach that imposes only one of the two
forms of partial abrogation will not solve the problem. If the states
were only to carve out an exception to the reporting requirement for
confessional communications, they would be left with only a partial
solution. Adopting that position implies that the privilege is abro-
gated as to spiritual advice counseling communications.'" If that ab-
rogation extends, however, to any subsequent criminal proceedings,
the erstwhile spiritual advice counseling communicant will be reluc-
tant to communicate.'"
Only by holding out the carrot of reinstating the privilege in sub-
sequent criminal proceedings is the reluctance of the perpetrator to
disclose the child abuse likely to be assuaged. Hence, the proposal to
address this quandary requires both: 1) excepting from the reporting
requirement privileged religiously protected communications; and 2)
despite the abrogation of the privilege at the child abuse reporting
stage as to other kinds of clergy-communicant communications (relat-
ing to spiritual advice), recognizing the privilege as to all types of
clergy-communicant communications by the perpetrator at his or her
subsequent criminal prosecution.
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE PROPOSAL—ISSUES AND CONCERNS
A. Establishment Issues
Serious constitutional issues can be raised in connection with the
proposal, mainly questions about whether recognition of an excep-
tion to the abrogation of the privilege only for religiously protected
communications would violate the Establishment Clause of the First
111 See supra notes 94-110 and accompanying text.
112 See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
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Amendment. Although religiously based conduct may not be pro-
tected against a statutory prohibition cast in neutral and generally
applicable terms, the U.S. Supreme Court also indicated in Employ-
ment Division v. Smith that a state might provide a nondiscriminatory
religious-practice exemption from a prohibitory law, presumably
without violating the Establishment Clause." 3 The type of exception
to the general abrogation of the privilege being proposed here might
well fall within such a religious-practice exemption. Of course, under
the Court's decisions, not all religious-practice exemptions constitute
permissible accommodations under the Establishment Clause. 114
The question is: When does an unlawful fostering of religion oc-
cur? An establishment concern raised by this proposal is whether it
involves governmental action that favors some religious denomina-
tions over others. Thus, religious denominations—such as Roman
Catholics, Greek Orthodox, probably Episcopalians and perhaps oth-
ers that provide for religiously based protection of the confidentiality of
confessional communications—would qualify for exemption from the
duty to report under the proposal. On the other hand, spiritual-advice
communications in religious denominations where the basis for
confidentiality is not religious doctrine may be generally privileged
but would not be exempted from the reporting requirement. Is this
an impermissible discrimination among religious denominations?
115 The Court stated:
[A1 society that believes in the negative protection accorded to religious be-
lief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation as well. It is
therefore not surprising that a number of States have made an exception to
their drug laws for sacramental peyote use. ... But to say that a nondiscrimi-
natory religious-practice exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable,
is not to say that it is constitutionally required, and that the appropriate occa-
sions for its creation can be discerned by the courts.
494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). Of course, this was dictum and the Court was not necessarily
opining generally on all such statutory exemptions.
114 In Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: "It is well-
established ... that ' [t] he limits of permissible state accommodation to religion are by no
means co-extensive with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause.'
There is ample room under the Establishment Clause for 'benevolent neutrality which will
permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.' ... At
some point, accommodation may devolve into an unlawful fostering of religion'" 483 U.S.
327, 334-35 (1987) (quoting Hobble v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136,
145 (1987); \Vali v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669, 673 (1970)).
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A 1971 U.S. Supreme Court case, Gillette v. United States, presented
somewhat similar issues in a different context. 119 Petitioners in that
case were religious objectors who claimed the benefit of a statutory
provision exempting from military service those who object to "par-
ticipation in war in any form." 118 Petitioners did not object to all par-
ticipation in war but only particular wars, for example, participation
in a war not deemed to be a "just war." 117
 The District Court construed
the statutory exemption clause to require objection to all wars. 118 In
response, petitioners argued that this was an impermissible discrimi-
nation among religious beliefs: interpreting the statute in this way
barred their claim to relief from military service. 119
Gillette involved a situation where the law imposed an affirmative
across-the-board duty—in that case, to report for military service; un-
der this proposal, to report child abuse despite the existence of a
clergy-communicant confidentiality privilege. In both situations, a re-
ligiously connected exemption from the affirmative duty is provided
by statute—in Gillette, for those who religiously object to all wars; un-
der the proposal, for those whose communications are compelled and
held confidential under religious doctrine.'" In both situations, an
argument could be made that, as framed, the exemption works an
establishment of religion by discriminating between different relig-
"5 401 U.S. 437 (1971). Close in time to the Gillette decision, the U.S. Supreme Court
decided Lemon a Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), in which it articulated a three-
part test for assessing constitutionality under the Establishment Clause. The Court has
sometimes, but not always, used the Lemon test in subsequent Establishment Clause cases.
The Lemon test involves a determination of whether the legislation has a secular purpose,
has a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and does not promote
excessive governmental entanglement with religion. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. The en-
tanglement issue in this context primarily involves the question whether, in being required
to distinguish between clergy privileges that are religiously based and those which are not,
the courts will be drawn into resolving religious questions in an impermissible way. The
issues thus raised are discussed in section B of this Part. See infra notes 129-133 and ac-
companying text.
116 Gillette, 401 U.S. at 437.
117 Id. at 440-41.
"a Id. at 440.
"a Id. at 441.
15' It can be argued that the cases are distinguishable: Although the statutory exemp-
tion in Gillette was broader than the exemption the petitioners claimed—all wars versus
particular wars—the exemption under this proposal arguably is the narrower one—ex-
emption is provided for religious denominations that religiously require and protect con-
fessional or similar communications, not for those which privilege all confidential spiritual-
advice communications. This distinction, however, is not significant if there is a valid neu-
tral nonreligious reason for providing the narrower exemption under the proposal.
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ions denominations through the grant of an exemption that has the
effect of benefiting only certain denominations.
Although there have been other important establishment deci-
sions since, 121 Gillette provides useful and instructive signposts for deal-
ing with the establishment issues raised by the proposal. Thus, the
Court in Gillette stated:
(T]he Establishment. Clause stands at least for the proposi-
tion that when government activities touch on the religious
sphere, they must be secular in purpose, evenhanded in op-
eration, and neutral in primary impact....
The critical weakness of petitioners' establishment claim
arises from the fact that § 6(j), on its face, simply does not
discriminate on the basis of religious affiliation or religious
belief, apart of course from beliefs concerning war.... The
specified objection must have a grounding in "religious
training and belief," but no particular sectarian affiliation or
theological position is required. ...
Section 6( j) serves a number of valid purposes having
nothing to do with a design to foster or favor any sect, relig-
ion, or cluster of religions. There are considerations of a
pragmatic nature, such as the hopelessness of converting a
sincere conscientious objector into an effective fighting man
... but. no doubt the section reflects as well the view that "in
the forum of conscience, duty to a moral power higher than
the State has always been maintained." . We have noted
that the legislative materials show congressional concern for
the hard choice that conscription would impose on consci-
entious objectors to war . . . .
Naturally the considerations just mentioned are
affirmative in character, going to support the existence of an
exemption rather than its restriction specifically to persons
who object to all war. The point is that these affirmative pur-
poses are neutral in the sense of the Establishment Clause.
Quite apart from the question whether the Free Exercise
Clause might require some sort of exemption, it is hardly
impermissible for Congress to attempt to accommodate free
exercise values .... "Neutrality" in matters of religion is not
inconsistent with "benevolence" by way of exemptions from
121 See Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 25 (1989); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S.
228, 255 (1982); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 624-25.
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onerous duties ... so long as an exemption is tailored
broadly enough that it reflects valid secular purposes. In the
draft area, for 30 years the exempting provision has focused
on individual conscientious objection, not on sectarian
affiliation. 122
Using the criteria reflected in the foregoing passage, one can
construct arguments in response to the establishment objections to
the exemption proposal. Thus, it can be argued that no particular
sectarian affiliation or theological position is required by the exemp-
tion—only that the clergy privilege be based in a religiously protected
communication. Some denominations contain such requirements;
many do not.
The proposed exemption arguably would have valid secular pur-
poses "having nothing to do with a design to foster or favor any sect,
religion, or cluster of religions." 03 It does not favor the adherents of
any one sect or religious organization any more than did the exemp-
tion in Gillette that applied only to those who objected to all wars. The
exemption "does not single out any religious organization or religious
creed for special treatment."I 24
The secular purposes of the proposed exemption involve consid-
erations of a pragmatic nature, having to do with the prevailing pat-
tern not to enforce a reporting requirement against those whose re-
ligious commitments prevent them from reporting the information. 125
It is not desirable to have a criminal law on the books that remains
unenforced even when violations have occurred. 126 A related prag-
matic consideration is to resolve the quandary created by the need to
reconcile the obligation to report child abuse with clergy-
communicant privileges that are religiously based and those that are
more broadly grounded. Carving out an exemption for religiously
based privileged communications despite the broader coverage of the
clergy privilege is a reasonable way to resolve this quandary.
As in the Gillette context, respect for the value of conscientious
action and for the principle of the supremacy of conscience would
also apply under the proposal. One can also say here that it is hardly
impermissible for the State to try to accommodate free exercise val-
122 401 U.S. at 450-54.
123
 Id. at 452.
124 Id. at 457.
125 See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
125 Generally, a failure to report is a misdemeanor under the state child abuse report-
ing statutes. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL Cour. § 11166(6) (West 2003).
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ues. 127 It is also important that a number of states still provide a clergy
privilege similar in scope to the proposed exemption and that histori-
cally, the clergy privilege was cast in terms similar to those provided in
the exemption under the proposal. 128
Overall, one can make a persuasive case against the establishment
objection to the exemption feature of the proposal, although like the
First Amendment issues previously discussed, the matter is not en-
tirely free from doubt.
B. The Constitutionality ofjudicial Consideration of Religious Questions
If a statute exempts the privilege for confessional communica-
tions from the reporting requirement, is there any constitutional ob-
jection to subjecting to judicial examination whether the clergy per-
son is religiously prohibited from disclosing the communication
regarding child abuse and therefore, under the proposal, not re-
quired to file a report? The answer is likely no, but one must consider
the constitutional issues.
Although there are First Amendment restrictions on certain
kinds of judicial forays into the religious garden, the U.S. Supreme
Court has not declared that all inquiry into religious questions is
barred. Thus, for example, even though courts are barred from de-
termining the truth or falsity of religious beliefs, in the context of a
fraud prosecution they are permitted to determine whether the relig-
ions beliefs are honestly held. 129 Similarly, courts are generally prohib-
ited from resolving ecclesiastical disputes among church members,
for example, where those dispute's affect property or trust matters,'"
Whereas in the exemption-from-reporting context, the judicial
determination may relate to the extent or application of religious
doctrine, the purpose and context of the inquiry is to resolve a secu-
lar, not a religious, question. Courts can obtain expert advice in re-
solving such questions."' The nature and difficulty of the inquiry may
127 see, e.g., Walt, 397 U.S. at 678 ("It is obviously correct that no one acquires a vested
or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use, even when that span of time
covers our entire national existence and indeed predates it. Yet an unbroken practice of
according the [tax) exemption to churches, openly and by affirmative state action, not
covertly or by state inaction, is not something to be lightly cast aside.").
128 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
229 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 85 (1949).
130 Presbyterian Church v. Blue Hull iviem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 440
(1969).
121 See, e.g., People v. Edwards, 248 Cal. Rptr. 53, 56-57 (Ct. App. 1988). In that case,
extensive testimony was given by church officials as to the discipline and tenets of the Epis-
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have a bearing on the question of whether the judicial inquiry in-
volves an impermissible entanglement." 2 The courts would not be
involved in resolving religious disputes. It is hard to see how such ju-
dicial evaluation would violate First Amendment interests." 3
C. Special Problems Arising Out of an Abrogation of the Privilege in One
Context and Its Subsequent Recognition in a Related Context
Does the fact that the clergy person is required to report an oth-
erwise-privileged spiritual-advice communication regarding child
abuse, but at the same time cannot be compelled to testify as to that
same communication in a subsequent criminal trial, create any special
problems?
At the outset, it should be noted that there is an oddity in adopt-
ing this approach. Our assumptions regarding the prototype situation
are as follows, The perpetrator communicates confidentially to his or
her clergy person who is then required to make an official report of
copal Church as bearing on the question whether the communications in question were
penitential communications within the meaning of the California clergy privilege statute.
Id. Often, too, the priest or minister's own view of the nature of the communication will
play a large role in the judicial determination of whether the privilege is applicable. See,
e.g., Kos v. State, 15 S.W. 3d 633, 638-40 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).
132 Thus in Amos, by statute, religious organizations were exempted from the provision
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibiting discrimination in employment based
on religion. 483 U.S. at 329. The question was whether applying the exemption to the
secular nonprofit activities of religious organizations violated the Establishment Clause. Id.
at 329-30. In support of the Court's conclusion that there was no constitutional violation,
Justice William Brennan, concurring in the judgment, addressed the question whether a
categorical exemption for nonprofit activities was justified and in that connection consid-
ered the appropriateness of a case by case determination of the character—religious or
not—of a nonprofit organization, stating: "What makes the application of a religious-
secular distinction difficult is that the character of an activity is not self-evident. As a result,
determining whether an activity is religious or secular requires a searching case-by-case
analysis. This results in considerable ongoing government entanglement in religious af-
fairs." Id. at 342 (Brennan, J., concurring).
By way of contrast, determining whether the tenets of a particular religious denomina-
tion religiously obligate the clergy to maintain secrecy is not the same kind of fact-intensive
determination that was under consideration in the Amos case. Although determining
whether a particular communication is covered by a religious obligation to maintain its
confidentiality, or falls under the heading of spiritual advice, may turn on the facts and
circumstances of the particular case, it would seem to be a rather straightforward inquiry
and not run the same type of risks of entanglement referred to by Justice Brennan in Amos.
See id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
133 Professor John Mansfield, also writing in this Symposium, may disagree with the
conclusion reached here. See John H. Mansfield, Constitutional Limits on the Liability of
Churches for Negligent Supervision and Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1167, 1179
(2003).
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the information. Various official steps are taken in the wake of this
report. If, however, the perpetrator is subsequently prosecuted, at the
criminal trial, the clergy member is barred by the privilege from testi-
fying about the original communication or the official report that was
made. Once the clergy member reveals confidential information and
the information is officially disclosed, it seems strange to permit a
privilege that protects confidentiality to be invoked at a later stage. It
would seem to be a classic case of "the cat out of the bag."I 34
As previously discussed, adopting such a set of rules can be
justified on policy grounds. The goal is to strike a balance between
incentives to disclose and protection of the abused child. Specific op-
erational aspects of this approach remain to be considered. One can
identify four principal categories of evidence whose status might be
privileged in the subsequent criminal proceeding. These categories
are:
1.Testimony relating to the statements regarding child abuse
made in the course of the parishioner's original communica-
tions to the clergy person that led to the reporting of the
child abuse.
2. Testimony regarding, or documentary evidence of, the
official report of child abuse that was filed.
3. Testimony regarding physical evidence or the introduction
of the physical evidence that was discovered by the police as
a result of the report of child abuse.
4. The identity of the victim discovered as a result of the
child abuse report. This is a special instance of cases that fall
under No. 3 above.
Given the goal of encouraging full disclosure by the perpetrator
in the context of clergy-parishioner confidential communications,
there are reasons to limit the incriminatory use of the otherwise-
privileged communications. Accordingly, in connection with the pro-
posal, it would be desirable to establish the following subsidiary rule:
at a criminal proceeding involving child abuse charges against the
original communicating perpetrator of child abuse, testimony or evi-
dence regarding the first three items listed above would be foreclosed
by the clergy-communicant privilege itself or by application of the
privilege supplemented by a notion of derivative use. Consistent with
the foregoing, however, evidence could be used to prosecute an al-
"'Oregon v. Llstad, 470 U.S. 298, 525 (1985) (Brent -m-1J, dissenting).
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leged perpetrator of child abuse if the police derive it from an inde-
pendent source, that is, a source independent of the communicating
perpetrator's otherwise-privileged communications to the clergy per-
SO n.
The idea of abrogating the privilege at one stage and then rein-
stating it at another stage and supplementing this rule with derivative
use and independent source doctrine has some loose parallel in rules
relating to the privilege against self-incrimination, where in some con-
texts testimony may be compelled under a grant of use immunity, and
neither the testimony nor evidence derived from it may be introduced
into evidence against the individual, but evidence gained from an in-
dependent source can be used. 155
 The analogy is, of course,
imperfect. The privileges are quite different, and the communications
from the abuser-perpetrator to the clergyman, unlike
communications in the Fifth Amendment context, are not compelled.
Still, in both instances, that is, under immunity-derivative use doctrine
and under the proposal, evidence and its derivatives may be used for
some purposes but may not be used to contribute to the criminal
conviction of the communicator. Both cases permit a selective use of
the disclosed information.
The most troubling application of the proposed approach to the
child abuse report-clergy privilege intersection involves the situation
where the police learn the identity of the victim of the abuse from the
report. It is very difficult to say to the police—when they learn about a
victim of whom they previously knew nothing—that they cannot use
that information to begin an investigation, including talking to the
victim.
Of course, if the police were able to use the identity of the victim,
although derived from the original disclosure by the perpetrator, this
would discourage many perpetrators from disclosing such infortna-
I " See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 442, 462 (1972) (examining the constitu-
tionality of compelling testimony by offering immunity in subsequent criminal proceed-
ings); Murphy v. Waterfront Comani, 378 U.S. 52, 103 (1964) (White, J., concurring)
(asserting that "lo]nce a defendant demonstrates that he has testified in a state proceed-
ing in exchange for immunity to matters related to the federal prosecution, the govern-
ment can be put to show that its evidence is not tainted by establishing that it had an inde-
pendent, legitimate source for the disputed evidence").
We refer to the use immunity-derivative use doctrine only by way of analogy to suggest
the kind of derivative evidence doctrine that might be applied. Another arena that has
some relevance by way of analogy is the poisonous fruit doctrine applied in connection
with illegal searches or tainted confessions. Sec generally Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963).
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don in an otherwise-privileged setting to their priest, minister or
rabbi. Permitting the use in the criminal prosecution of information
derived from the victim whose identity was revealed through the
official report of child abuse would create a very large loophole in the
derivative-use protection afforded to the perpetrator.
Whether to adopt a live-witness exception to the no derivative-use
rule is thus a close and hard question that may have a significant im-
pact on the operation of the rule. United States v. Ceccolini recognized
such a special live-witness exception to the poisonous fruit doctrine in
the search and seizure arena: "Witnesses are not like guns or docu-
ments."'"
The victim-witness issue in the child abuse report-privileged
communication context is arguably different, however, from the dis-
covery of a live witness as the fruit of an illegal search and seizure.
Whether identifying a live witness results from an illegal search and
seizure is a matter of chance, probably not occurring with great fre-
quency. Carving out an exception to the derivative-evidence exclu-
sionary rule thus does not make much of an inroad on the applica-
tion of the rule applied to search and seizures. In the child abuse
reporting context, however, the identity of the victim will always be
disclosed in the report. Allowing a live-witness exception to a rule
barring the use in the criminal prosecution of the report or evidence
derived from it would essentially undermine the purpose of the rule:
to encourage disclosure of information regarding child abuse.
CONCLUSION
The most striking aspect of the conflict between the
confidentiality afforded by the clergy privilege statutes and the disclo-
sure obligations mandated by the child abuse reporting statutes is the
number of different ways in which that conflict has been resolved by
the states. Because of the frequency with which clergy move from pul-
pit to pulpit and for other reasons, this is an area of law where some
consistency and uniformity among the states is needed.
In aid of a search for uniformity, an approach that on its face is
rather unusual has been proposed: in cases where the communication
falls under the heading of spiritual advice, abrogate the clergy-
communicant privilege in regard to the obligation to report child
abuse; the clergy person must report the child abuse. In a criminal
"B 435 U.S. 268, 276 (1978),
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proceeding against the same perpetrator, however, revive the privilege
as to the original communications and evidence derived therefrom.
The aim is to encourage communication about the child abuse by as-
suring the communicating offender that his or her incriminating
statements will not be used in a criminal prosecution.
Further, do not abrogate the privilege and require the clergy per-
son to report where the communication was protected against disclo-
sure as a matter of religious doctrine. Specially protecting communi-
cations that are protected against disclosure by the requirements of
religious doctrine may be seen as a limited return to the historical
roots of the clergy-communicant privilege.
In the realm of child abuse reporting, the question of whether a
member of the clergy should be required to report child abuse when
the information is obtained through otherwise-privileged communi-
cation poses a difficult social policy conflict. Where the clergy privi-
lege protects communications that resemble those in other profes-
sional-client counseling relationships, the legal claim for protection
against the obligation to report is not very strong. The claim for pro-
tection is stronger if mandatory reporting would require violation of a
clergy member's religious convictions. The best way to deal with the
difference between these two kinds of claims is to treat them sepa-
rately and differently.
Of course, issues relating to application of the clergy privilege,
while very important, may be viewed as but a sideshow in the current
efforts to bring to light information relating to child sexual abuse
perpetrated by members of the clergy. In the end, efforts in an institu-
tion to keep unprivileged information about such matters secret or
confidential almost always fail. It is always better to produce the in-
formation early and completely.
